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Abstract
The literature on treatment effects focuses on gross benefits from program participation.
We extend this literature by developing conditions under which it is possible to identify
parameters measuring the cost and net surplus from program participation. Using the
generalized Roy model, we nonparametrically identify the cost, benefit, and net surplus
of selection into treatment without requiring the analyst to have direct information on
the cost. We apply our methodology to estimate the gross benefit and net surplus of
attending college.
JEL Codes: I21, C31, C32
Key Words: Cost-Benefit Analysis, Treatment Effects, Returns and Costs to Education
1 Introduction
The traditional approach to the evaluation of public policy compares the benefits and
costs of policies. Measures of net surplus are used to determine whether policies should
be undertaken (see Hotelling, 1938; Tinbergen, 1956; Harberger and Jenkins, 2002; and
Chetty, 2009). The recent literature on program evaluation, or “treatment effects”, fo-
cuses on gross benefits of policies and considers neither the marginal costs nor the per-
ceived surplus associated with the programs being evaluated.1
We extend this literature using the generalized Roy model. In it, agents choose treat-
ment if their expected surplus from doing so is positive, so the benefit outweighs the
subjective cost. We present conditions under which we can use the economics of the
model to identify cost and surplus parameters even without direct information on the
cost of treatment. Information on revealed choices creates a simple relationship between
the cost and benefit parameters: for individuals who are indifferent towards treatment
participation, the benefit equals the cost and the surplus is zero. Building on existing
identification results for benefit parameters, we show how to identify surplus and cost
parameters by varying the margin of indifference. Our identification analysis applies
traditional exclusion restrictions that separately shift costs and benefits from treatment.
We use cost shifters to identify the benefit of treatment and benefit shifters to vary the
margin of indifference and thus to identify the cost of the treatment.
Our analysis complements and extends the work by Bjo¨rklund and Moffitt (1987)
who first noted the duality between cost and benefit parameters in the generalized Roy
model. They estimate marginal gains and surpluses for policies within a parametric
normal generalized Roy model. They use structural econometric methods to identify the
components of the cost and benefit functions. This paper extends their analysis to a more
general setting. It develops and applies a nonparametric identification analysis of benefits,
costs, and surpluses without the need to identify all of the ingredients of a fully specified
structural model. This approach implements Marschak’s Maxim (Heckman, 2010) by
directly estimating the cost, benefit, and surplus parameters rather then constructing
1See the discussion in Heckman and Vytlacil (2007) and Heckman (2010).
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them from the estimates of a full structural model.
We present ex ante and ex post analyses of costs and benefits. Applying our methods
to the data on ex post gross benefits analyzed by Carneiro et al. (2011), we find that
heterogeneity in benefits, and not costs, is the main driver of the variability in the decision
to attend college.
Our analysis is reminiscent of the Heckman (1974) model of female labor supply. In
that analysis, the econometrician observes the offered wage only for the agents who choose
to work. The economist does not observe the reservation wage of any agent. Yet, his
analysis identifies the parameters of the offered wage equation and the reservation wage
equation by using the implication of the underlying economic model that agents decide
to work if the offered wage exceeds the reservation wage.2 In our analysis, we observe
program outcomes for agents who select into treatment, and we observe the no treatment
outcome for the agents who do not select into treatment. We do not observe the cost of
treatment for any agent. Yet, using the economics of the model, we are able to identify
the average benefit and average cost of treatment parameters by exploiting the agent’s
decision rule of selecting into treatment if the benefit exceeds the cost.
Our analysis is very different from analyses using randomized experiments to infer
treatment effects. In commonly implemented randomizations, it is not possible to identify
the choice probability (Heckman, 1992; Heckman and Smith, 1995). Instead of using
randomization to bypass problems of self-selection, we exploit the information that agents
self-select into treatment and infer information on the cost of the treatment that cannot
be recovered by standard randomized experiments.
The paper unfolds in the following way. Section 2 introduces the generalized Roy
model. Section 3 reviews the average benefit of treatment parameters from Heckman and
Vytlacil (1999, 2005, 2007), and develops and analyzes the dual cost parameters that
match the benefit parameters. Section 4 presents our identification analysis of the cost
and surplus parameters. Section 5 extends our analysis to allow agents to have imperfect
foresight about future outcomes. We apply our analysis to study the decision to attend
2The same methodology applies to search theory, see Flinn and Heckman (1982).
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college in Section 6. Section 7 concludes.
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2 The Generalized Roy Model
Suppose there are two potential outcomes (Y0, Y1), and a choice indicator D with D = 1
if the agent selects into treatment so that Y1 is observed and D = 0 if the agent does not
select into treatment so that Y0 is observed. Anticipating our empirical analysis, Y1 is the
annualized flow of income from college and Y0 is the annualized flow of income from high
school. The observed outcome Y can be written in switching regression form (Quandt,
1958, 1972):
Y = DY1 + (1−D)Y0, (2.1)
where E(Yj | X) = µj and
Yj = µj(X) + Uj (2.2)
for j = 0, 1. X is a vector of regressors observed by the economist while (U0, U1) are not.
Combining Equations (2.1) and (2.2),
Y = µ0(X) + {[µ1(X)− µ0(X)] + U1 − U0}D + U0.
The individual gross benefit of treatment associated with moving an otherwise identical
person from state “0” to “1” is B = Y1 − Y0 and is defined as the causal effect on Y of
a ceteris paribus move from “0” to “1”. Defining E(C | Z) = µC(Z), the subjective cost
of choosing treatment as perceived by the agent is
C = µC(Z) + UC , (2.3)
where Z is an observed random vector of cost shifters and UC is a random variable
unobserved by the econometrician. Individuals choose treatment if the perceived benefit
from treatment is greater than the subjective cost:
D = 1 if S ≥ 0 ; D = 0 otherwise, (2.4)
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where S is the surplus, i.e. the net benefit, from treatment:
S = (Y1 − Y0)− C
= {[µ1(X)− µ0(X)]− µC(Z)} − [UC − (U1 − U0)]
= µS(X,Z)− V,
with µS(X,Z) = [µ1(X)− µ0(X)]− µC(Z) and V = UC − (U1 − U0). Our identification
analysis of cost and surplus parameters does not assume particular functional forms for
µ0, µ1, and µC , nor does it assume that the distributions of U0, U1, and UC are of a
known parametric form.
The original Roy (1951) model assumes that there are no observed regressors, X, that
the cost of treatment is identically zero (i.e. µC = 0, UC = 0) and that (U0, U1) ∼ N(0,Σ).
Heckman and Honore´ (1990) present an identification analysis for a nonparametric version
of the Roy model using variation in regressors and making no parametric assumption on
the distribution of (U0, U1). Their version of the Roy model also imposes the condition
that the cost of treatment is identically zero. In contrast, we allow for non-zero cost
of treatment. In fact, for our identification analysis we require nondegenerate cost of
treatment and observed cost shifters.3 From the point of view of the observing economist,
(X,Z) is observed and (U1, U0, UC) is unobserved. This model assumes that agents know
the gross benefit, B = Y1 − Y0, of treatment. We show in Section 5 that our results
extend to a broader class of models, where agents only have imperfect foresight about
the benefits of treatment. This model also supposes that there is no other aspect of the
benefit of treatment than Y1 − Y0. Implicitly, any subjective benefits of the program are
3Because Heckman and Honore´ (1990) impose a Roy model with zero cost of treatment, they are
able to identify the joint distribution of (U0, U1). In contrast, because we allow for nonzero cost
of treatment (and, in particular, for unobserved costs of treatment), we are unable to identify the
dependence between U0 and U1 which precludes the identification of some potentially interesting
economic parameters. See Heckman (1990), Heckman and Smith (1998) and Heckman et al. (1997b)
for related analysis. With additional information, the joint distribution of (U1, U0, UC) can be iden-
tified. See, e.g., Carneiro et al. (2003), Aakvik et al. (2005), and Abbring and Heckman (2007).
D’Haultfoeuille and Maurel (2013) identify the cost of treatment in a related Roy model in which the
cost of treatment is a deterministic function of observed covariates. Their identification strategy is
fundamentally different from ours and critically relies on the restriction that the cost of treatment is
constant conditional on covariates.
7
incorporated into the costs of treatment, i.e., the cost function includes the subjective
benefits of the treatment. For example, if job training allows the individual to work
in a job with preferred amenities, this is modeled as a (negative) contribution to the
subjective cost of treatment. The classification of effects in either positive benefits or
negative subjective cost (or vice versa) does not affect the definition of the surplus. To
simplify the exposition, we suppose that Z and X do not contain any common elements.
Thus, all of our analysis can be seen as implicitly conditioning on all common elements
of X and Z.
We make the following technical assumptions:
(A-1) (U0, U1, UC) is independent of (X,Z).
(A-2) The distribution of µC(Z) conditional on X is absolutely continuous with respect
to Lebesgue measure.
(A-3) The distribution of V = UC − (U1 − U0) is absolutely continuous with respect to
Lebesgue measure and has a cumulative distribution function that is strictly increasing.
(A-4) The population means E|Y1|, E|Y0| and E|C| are finite.
Assumption (A-1) assumes that (U0, U1, UC) is independent of (X,Z). Thus, D is
endogenous, but all other regressors in both the treatment equation and the outcome
equation are exogenous. We implicitly condition on any regressors that enter both the
outcome equations and the cost equation. Thus, this condition should be interpreted
as an independence assumption for the error terms with regard to the unique elements
of X and Z conditional on the regressors that enter both equations. No independence
condition is required for the common elements. We also do not impose any restrictions
on the dependence among the unobservables. (A-2) requires that there exists at least one
continuous component of Z conditional on X. This assumption will only be required for
our identification analysis, and is not needed for our definition or analysis of the cost and
surplus parameters. (A-3) is a regularity condition. It allows for the possibility that UC
is degenerate (costs do not vary conditional on Z) or that U1−U0 is degenerate (benefits
do not vary conditional on X), though not both. Assumption (A-4) is required for the
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mean benefit and cost parameters to be well defined. An implication of our model with
Assumptions (A-1) and (A-3) is that 0 < Pr(D = 1 | X,Z) < 1 w.p.1, so that there is a
treated group and a control group for almost all (X,Z). Note that this restriction still
allows the support of the distribution of Pr(D = 1|X,Z) to be the full unit interval.
Let P (X,Z) denote the probability of selecting into treatment given (X,Z). Statisti-
cians call this the “propensity score” P (X,Z) ≡ Pr(D = 1 | X,Z) = FV (µS(X,Z)),
where FV (·) denotes the distribution of V .4 We sometimes denote P (X,Z) by P ,
suppressing the (X,Z) argument. We also work with US, a uniform random variable
(US ∼ Unif[0, 1]) defined by US = FV (V ). Different values of US denote different quan-
tiles of V . Given our previous assumptions, FV is strictly increasing, and P (X,Z) is a
continuous random variable conditional on X.
The generalized Roy model presented in this paper is a special case of the model
of Heckman and Vytlacil (1999, 2005). Under Assumptions (A-1)–(A-4), the model of
Equations (2.1)–(2.4) implies the model and assumptions of Heckman and Vytlacil (1999,
2005). From the analysis of Vytlacil (2002), the more general model is equivalent to the
conditions that justify the Local Average Treatment Effect (LATE) model of Imbens
and Angrist (1994). We impose more restrictions here. In particular, we impose the
generalized Roy model and the corresponding assumptions that will allow us to exploit
its structure for identification of subjective cost parameters. As in the conventional Roy
model (Heckman and Sedlacek, 1985), we assume additive separability in the outcome
equations. Additive separability is not required in Heckman and Vytlacil (1999, 2005)
but is required by our analysis in order to obtain additive separability in the latent index
equation consistent with the generalized Roy model.5 Thus our assumptions are most
appropriate for continuous outcome variables, and we exclude discrete outcomes from our
analysis. We also assume conditions on X that are not required in Heckman and Vytlacil
(1999, 2005) to identify the gross benefit parameters. Their analysis conditions on X and
4We will refer to the cumulative distribution function of a random vector A by FA(·) and to the
cumulative distribution function of a random vector A conditional on random vector B by FA|B(·).
We write the cumulative distribution function of A conditional on B = b by FA|B(· | b).
5Recall again that we are implicitly conditioning on all common elements of (X,Z), so that these need
not be additively separable from the error term.
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thus does not need to assume that X is independent of the error vector. In contrast, in
order to use the generalized Roy model to recover subjective cost parameters, we require
that the unique elements X are independent of the error vector.6
6In this respect, our analysis is broadly analogous to the identification strategies and conditions of
Vytlacil and Yildiz (2007) and Shaikh and Vytlacil (2011), who also require that there be exogenous
regressors in the outcome equation that is excluded from the treatment choice equation, and they
exploit variation in such regressors for identification.
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3 Benefit, Cost, and Surplus Parameters
This section defines and analyzes the benefit, cost, and surplus parameters. We maintain
the model of Equations (2.1)–(2.4), and invoke Assumptions (A-1) and (A-3)–(A-4). We
do not require Assumption (A-2) for the definition of the parameters but do require it
for our identification analysis.
Standard treatment effect analyses identify averaged parameters of the gross benefit
of treatment, B = Y1 − Y0. The most commonly studied treatment effect parameter
is the average benefit of treatment BATE(x) ≡ E(Y1 − Y0 | X = x) = µ1(x) − µ0(x).
This is the effect of assigning treatment randomly to everyone of type X = x, assuming
full compliance and ignoring any general equilibrium effects. Another commonly used
parameter is the average benefit of treatment on persons who actually take the treatment,
referred to as the benefit of treatment on the treated: BTT (x) ≡ E(Y1−Y0 | X = x,D =
1) = µ1(x) − µ0(x) + E(U1 − U0|X = x,D = 1). Heckman and Vytlacil (1999, 2005)
unify a broad class of treatment effect parameters including the BATE(x) and BTT (x)
through the marginal benefit of treatment, defined as BMTE(x, uS) ≡ E(Y1 − Y0|X =
x, US = uS) = µ1(x)− µ0(x) +E(U1 −U0|US = uS). BMTE(x, uS) is the treatment effect
parameter that conditions on the unobserved desire to select into treatment.
The conventional analysis of treatment effects does not define, identify, or estimate any
aspect of the cost of the treatment. We define a set of cost parameters parallel to the
benefit parameters, where cost is the subjective cost as perceived by the agent. Thus, we
define the average cost of treatment, the average cost of treatment on the treated, and
the marginal cost of treatment as follows:
CATE(z) = E(C|Z = z) = µC(z)
CTT (z) = E(C|Z = z,D = 1) = µC(z) + E(UC |Z = z,D = 1)
CMTE(z, uS) = E(C|Z = z, US = uS) = µC(z) + E(UC |US = uS).
Recalling that S = B −C = µS(X,Z)− V , where µS(X,Z) = [µ1(X)− µ0(X)]− µC(Z)
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and V = UC − (U1 − U0), we can define the corresponding surplus parameters:
SATE(x, z) = E(S|X = x, Z = z) = µS(x, z)
SMTE(x, z, uS) = E(S|X = x, Z = z, US = uS) = µS(x, z)− E(V |US = uS)
and
STT (x, z) = E(S|X = x, Z = z,D = 1) = µS(x, z)− E(V |X = x, Z = z,D = 1).
With these parameters, we can answer questions not only about the outcome change
from treatment but also about the subjective cost of treatment as well as the net sur-
plus. As the surplus from treatment participation STT (x, z) is always positive among the
treated, it follows immediately that BTT (x) > CTT (z) holds as well. Following Heckman
and Vytlacil (1999, 2005), we can represent the average treatment effects and treatment
on the treated as averaged versions of the marginal effects of treatment:
BATE(x) =
∫ 1
0
BMTE(x, uS)duS
BTT (x) =
∫ 1
0
BMTE(x, uS)
1−FP |X(uS |x)∫ 1
0 (1−FP |X(t|x))dt
duS.
(3.1)
Following the same line of argument as used by Heckman and Vytlacil (1999, 2005),
CATE(z) =
∫ 1
0
CMTE(z, uS)duS
CTT (z) =
∫ 1
0
CMTE(z, uS)
1−FP |Z(uS |z)∫ 1
0 (1−FP |Z(t|z))dt
duS,
(3.2)
and
SATE(x, z) =
∫ 1
0
SMTE(x, z, uS)duS
STT (x, z) = 1
P (x,z)
∫ P (x,z)
0
SMTE(x, z, uS)duS.
(3.3)
We now establish relationships among these parameters. First, consider the marginal
surplus parameter. Recall that US = FV (V ) with FV strictly increasing. Thus US = uS
12
is equivalent to V = F−1V (uS), and
SMTE(x, z, uS) = µS(x, z)− E
(
V |V = F−1V (uS)
)
= µS(x, z)− F−1V (uS).
F−1V is strictly increasing, and thus S
MTE(x, z, uS) is strictly decreasing in uS. Individuals
with low uS want to enter the program the most and are those with the highest surplus
from the program, while individuals with high uS want to enter the program the least
and have the smallest surplus from the program. Using the fact that FV is strictly
increasing and that P (X,Z) = FV (µS(X,Z)), conditioning on us = P (x, z) is equivalent
to conditioning on V = µS(x, z). Thus
SMTE(x, z, P (x, z)) = µS(x, z)− E (V |V = µS(x, z)) = 0.
An individual with uS = P (x, z) is an individual who is indifferent between being
treated and untreated if assigned X = x and Z = z. Since SMTE(x, z, uS) is strictly
decreasing in uS, S
MTE(x, z, uS) is positive for uS < P (x, z), is equal to zero at uS =
P (x, z), and is negative if uS > P (x, z). If we instead fix evaluation point uS and consider
how SMTE(x, z, uS) varies with (x, z), S
MTE(x, z, uS) will be positive for all (x, z) such
that P (x, z) > uS and will be negative for all (x, z) such that P (x, z) < uS.
We have thus far discussed only the marginal surplus function. Using the relationship
SMTE(x, z, uS) = B
MTE(x, uS)−CMTE(z, uS), we can translate statements about SMTE(x, z, uS)
into inequalities about the marginal benefit and marginal cost functions:
BMTE(x, uS) > C
MTE(z, uS) ∀ (x, z, uS) s.t. P (x, z) > uS
BMTE(x, uS) = C
MTE(z, uS) ∀ (x, z, uS) s.t. P (x, z) = uS
BMTE(x, uS) < C
MTE(z, uS) ∀ (x, z, uS) s.t. P (x, z) < uS.
The benefit and cost parameters coincide when evaluated at uS = P (x, z) because at
this point the marginal cost equals the marginal benefit. We exploit this equality at the
margin of indifference in the next section to achieve identification of the cost parameters.
To fix ideas, in Figure 1 we display the full set of marginal effects for a numerical ex-
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ample. We plot the marginal effect functions for fixed values of (x, z), where it happens
that P (x, z) = 0.50. Individuals at that margin, uS = 0.50, have their benefit of treat-
ment just offset by their subjective cost and are thus indifferent between participation in
treatment and nonparticipation. The benefits are positive but so are the costs. Overall,
the surplus is zero. For uS < 0.50, the marginal benefit function lies above the marginal
cost function and thus the marginal surplus is strictly positive. The reverse is true for
uS > 0.50.
Figure 1: Marginal Effects of Treatment
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This example is constructed to have intuitive properties, with the marginal benefit of
treatment BMTE(x, uS) decreasing in uS and the marginal cost of treatment C
MTE(z, uS)
increasing in uS. Agents with the greatest unobserved desire to select into treatment not
only have higher benefits but also have lower costs. These properties, while intuitive, need
not hold in general—individuals with lower values of uS (and thus a greater unobserved
desire to take treatment) must necessarily have higher net surplus than those with higher
values of uS, but they need not have higher benefits and lower costs. It is possible, for
example, that benefits and costs are so strongly positively correlated that those with the
greatest unobserved desire to participate have either the smallest benefits and the lowest
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costs or the largest benefits and the highest costs. In Appendix A, we establish sufficient
conditions for intuitive properties on BMTE(x, uS) and C
MTE(z, uS) to hold, as well as
testable implications of those conditions.
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4 Identifying the Surplus and Benefit Functions
Nonparametrically
Heckman and Vytlacil (1999, 2005) show that local instrumental variables (LIV) identify
the marginal benefit of treatment:
∂E( Y | X = x, P = p )
∂p
= BMTE(x, p). (4.1)
We can identify E(Y |X = x, P = p) and its derivative for all (x, p) ∈ Supp(X,P ),
where Supp(X,P ) denotes the support of (X,P (X,Z)).7 We can thus identifyBMTE(x, uS)
for all values of (x, uS) ∈ Supp(X,P ). For a fixed x, we can identify BMTE(x, uS) for
uS ∈ Supp(P |X = x). The more variation in propensity scores P conditional on X = x,
the larger the set of evaluation points uS for which we identify B
MTE(x, uS). Variation
in propensity scores conditional on X is driven by variation in Z, the cost shifters. Thus,
if we observe regressors that produce large variations in costs, we will be able to identify
BMTE(x, uS) on a larger set.
We can identify BATE(x) and BTT (x) by identifying BMTE(x, uS) over the appropriate
support and then integrating the latter with the appropriate weights, which are known
given data on X and Z. By Equation (3.1), we identify BATE(x) if Supp(P |X = x) =
[0, 1]. For fixedX = x, this requires that there be enough variation in the cost shifters Z to
drive the probabilities P (x, Z) all the way to zero and to one. In other words, holding fixed
the regressors that enter the outcome equation, we must observe cost shifters such that
conditional on some values of those cost shifters, the cost to the agent is so low that the
agent will select into treatment with probability arbitrarily close to one, and, conditional
on other values of the cost shifters, the cost to the agent is so high that the agent will select
into treatment with probability arbitrarily close to zero. Likewise, we identify BTT (x)
if Supp(P |X = x) = [0, pmaxx ], where pmaxx is the supremum of Supp(P |X = x). This
support requirement in turn requires that, for fixed X = x, there be enough variation in
7For any random vectors A and B, we will write the support of the distribution of A as Supp(A) and
the support of distribution of A conditional on B = b as Supp(A|B = b).
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the cost shifters Z to drive the selection probability arbitrarily close to zero.8
Using Equation (4.1) and the relationship for people on the margin of choice that
BMTE(x, P (x, z)) = CMTE(z, P (x, z)), we have
∂E( Y | X = x, P = p )
∂p
∣∣∣∣
p=P (x,z)
= CMTE(z, P (x, z)). (4.2)
Using this relationship, we identify CMTE(z, uS) for all values of (z, uS) ∈ Supp(Z, P ).
We thus identify the marginal cost parameter without direct information on the cost
of treatment by using the structure of the Roy model and by identifying the marginal
benefit of treatment for individuals at the margin of participation. For a fixed z, we
identify CMTE(z, uS) for uS ∈ Supp(P |Z = z). The greater the variation in propensity
scores conditional on Z = z, the larger the set of evaluation points for which we identify
CMTE(z, uS). Variation in propensity scores conditional on Z = z is driven by variation
in X, the regressors that affect the potential outcomes and thus that drive the benefit of
treatment. If we observe X regressors that cause large variations in benefits, we will be
able to identify CMTE(z, uS) at a larger set of uS evaluation points. In contrast, if there
are no X regressors, then P only depends on Z and we can only identify CMTE(z, uS)
for uS = P (z).
From Equation (3.2), we can identify CATE(z) if Supp(P |Z = z) = [0, 1]. This re-
quires, for fixed Z = z, for there to be enough variation in the outcome shifters X to
drive the probabilities P (X,Z) all the way to zero and to one. In other words, holding
fixed the regressors that enter the cost equation, we must observe outcome shifters such
that conditional on some values of those outcome shifters, the benefit to the agent is so
high that the agent will select into treatment with probability arbitrarily close to one;
conditional on other values of the outcome shifters, the benefit to the agent is so low
that the agent will select into treatment with probability arbitrarily close zero. Like-
wise, we identify CTT (x) if Supp(P |Z = z) = [0, pmaxz ] where pmaxz is the supremum of
8Heckman and Vytlacil (2001a) show that one can identify BATE(x) and BTT (x) under slightly weaker
conditions than those required to follow this strategy of first identifying BMTE(x, u) over the appro-
priate support. In particular, they show that the necessary and sufficient condition for identification
of BATE(x) is that {0, 1} ∈Supp(P |X = x) and for BTT (x) that {0} ∈Supp(P |X = x).
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Supp(P |Z = z). This support requirement in turn requires that, for fixed Z = z, there is
sufficient variation in the outcome shifters X to drive the probabilities arbitrarily close
to zero.
Finally, consider identification of the surplus parameters. Using the fact that
SMTE(x, z, uS) = B
MTE(x, uS)− CMTE(z, uS),
we can identify the marginal surplus parameter at (x, z, uS) such that (x, uS) ∈ Supp(X,P )
and (z, uS) ∈ Supp(Z, P ). By Equation (3.3), we can integrate SMTE(x, z, uS) using
the appropriate weights (which are identified from the data on X and Z) to identify
SATE(x, z) and STT (x, z) under the appropriate support conditions. For example, we
identify SATE(x, z) if Supp(P |X = x) = [0, 1] and Supp(P |Z = z) = [0, 1].
Thus, for identification of the treatment parameters we need sufficient variation in cost
shifters conditional on the outcome shifters. For identification of the cost parameters,
we need sufficient variation in the outcome shifters conditional on the cost shifters. For
identification of the surplus parameters we need sufficient variation in both sets of regres-
sors. We can thus identify the marginal cost, the average cost, and the cost of treatment
without direct information on the cost. Consequently, we can also identify the corre-
sponding surplus parameters as well. Our ability to do so is directly related to the extent
of variation in observed regressors that shift the benefit of the treatment.
We summarize our discussion in the form of a theorem:
Theorem 1. Assume that Equations (2.1)–(2.4) and our Assumptions (A-1)–(A-4) hold.
1. BMTE(x, uS) is identified for (x, uS) ∈ Supp(X,P ); CMTE(z, uS) is identified for
(z, uS) ∈ Supp(Z, P ); and SMTE(x, z, uS) is identified for (x, z, uS) such that
(x, uS) ∈ Supp(X,P ) and (z, uS) ∈ Supp(Z, P ).
2. BATE(x) is identified if Supp(P |X = x) = [0, 1]; CATE(z) is identified if
Supp(P |Z = z) = [0, 1]; SATE(x, z) is identified if Supp(P |X = x) = [0, 1] and
Supp(P |Z = z) = [0, 1].
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3. BTT (x) is identified if Supp(P |X = x) = [0, pmaxx ]; CTT (z) is identified if
Supp(P |Z = z) = [0, pmaxz ]; STT(x, z) is identified if Supp(P |X = x) = [0, pmaxx ]
and Supp(P |Z = z) = [0, pmaxz ].
Our results allow for unobserved heterogeneity in costs and benefits conditional on
the observed regressors. If there is no unobserved (by the economist) heterogeneity in
the costs of treatment, UC = 0, then C
MTE(z, uS) = C
TT (z) = CATE(z) and thus we
can identify the cost of treatment on the treated and average cost parameters without
the additional support conditions. Likewise, if we impose that there is no unobserved
heterogeneity in the benefits of treatment, U1−U0 = 0, we have BMTE(z, uS) = BTT (z) =
BATE(z) and can thus identify all of the benefit parameters without additional support
conditions.
We establish identification of the marginal effect parameters within the conditional
support of P . However, exploiting additive separability, we are able to extend the margin
of identification to the unconditional support of P by a chaining argument. We illustrate
the reasoning behind this for the BMTE(x, uS), but the analogous result applies to the
marginal cost and surplus functions as well.
Recall that BMTE(x, uS) = µ1(x) − µ0(x) + E(U1 − U0|US = uS) is identified for all
(x, uS) ∈ Supp(X,P ). How BMTE(x, uS) varies with x does not depend on the point of
evaluation of uS, and how B
MTE(x, uS) varies with uS does not depend on the point of
evaluation of x. This insight is helpful in securing identification of BMTE(x, uS) for other
(x, uS) pairs.
For example, consider two potential values of X, x0 and x1, and suppose that there
exists some p∗ such that p∗ ∈ Supp(P |X = x0) ∩ Supp(P |X = x1) so that BMTE(x0, p∗)
and BMTE(x1, p
∗) are both identified by Theorem 1. BMTE(x, uS) is additively separable
in x and uS. As a consequence of additive separability, it follows directly that
BMTE(x0, uS)−BMTE(x0, p∗) = BMTE(x1, uS)−BMTE(x1, p∗). (4.3)
If uS ∈ Supp(P |X = x1), we identify BMTE(x1, uS) by Theorem 1. We can solve Equation
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(4.3) to identify BMTE(x0, uS) even if uS 6∈ Supp(P |X = x0). Alternatively, if uS ∈
Supp(P |X = x0), we identify BMTE(x0, uS) by Theorem 1 and can now solve Equation
(4.3) to identify BMTE(x1, uS) even if uS 6∈ Supp(P |X = x1). Thus, if there exists some p∗
such that p∗ ∈ Supp(P |X = x0) ∩ Supp(P |X = x1), we can chain together identification
of BMTE(x0, uS) for uS ∈ Supp(P |X = x0) and identification of BMTE(x1, uS) for uS ∈
Supp(P |X = x1) to obtain identification of BMTE(x0, uS) and BMTE(x1, uS) for all uS ∈
Supp(P |X = x0) ∪ Supp(P |X = x1). One can iterate to further increase the range
of values for which BMTE(x, uS) is identified. Under an additional rank condition, we
can use this strategy to identify BMTE(x, uS) for all (x, uS) ∈ Supp(X) × Supp(P ). In
particular, we consider the following assumption:
(A-5) X and P (X,Z) are measurably separated; i.e., any function of X that almost
surely equals a function of P (X,Z) must be almost surely equal to a constant.
Measurable separability between X and P is a rank condition. A necessary condition
for measurable separability between X and P (X,Z) is for P (X,Z) to be nondegenerate
conditional on X, as implied by P (X,Z) = FV (µS(X,Z)) along with Assumptions (A-2)
and (A-3). In Theorem 5 in Appendix A, we build on Theorem 2 of Florens et al. (2008)
to provide sufficient conditions on our model for measurable separability between X and
P (X,Z). As shown by that theorem, strengthened versions of Assumptions (A-2) and (A-
3), along with an additional support condition, are sufficient for measurable separability
between X and P (X,Z).
Using Assumption (A-5), we obtain the following identification result:
Theorem 2. Assume that Equations (2.1)–(2.4) and our Assumptions (A-1)–(A-5) hold.
Then, for x ∈ Supp(X) and z ∈ Supp(Z),
1. BMTE(x, uS), C
MTE(z, uS), and S
MTE(x, z, uS) are identified for uS ∈ Supp(P ).
2. BATE(x), CATE(z), and SATE(x, z) are identified if Supp(P ) = [0, 1],
and
3. BTT (x), CTT (z), and STT(x, z) are identified if Supp(P ) = [0, pmax].
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The proof of Theorem 2 is in Appendix B. The theorem shows that, under our main-
tained assumptions and condition (A-5), identification of the treatment parameters de-
pends on the marginal support of P , not on the support of P conditional on X or Z.
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5 Extension to the Case of Limited Information by the
Agent
Thus far, our analysis has assumed choice Equation (2.4), i.e., that D = 1[S ≥ 0]
where S = (Y1 − Y0) − C. This implicitly assumes that agents have perfect foresight
about their net benefit. In this section, we extend the choice model of Equation (2.4)
to allow for limited information on the part of the agents, while maintaining the model
for latent outcomes (Y0, Y1) and cost C of Equations (2.2) and (2.3). We assume that
agents form valid expectations about their outcomes and costs given the information that
they have at the time of their treatment choice and that they select into treatment if the
expected surplus is positive. We allow agents to know only some elements of (X,Z), and
possibly to have incomplete knowledge of (U0, U1, UC) and hence their own idiosyncratic
benefit and cost of treatment. We now show that the preceding analysis goes through
with minor modifications, though it is now important to distinguish conditioning sets:
what is known to the agent at the time of treatment choice (which might include some
information not known to the econometrician), what is known to the econometrician
(which might include some information not known to the agent at the time of treatment
choice), and what is realized ex post. The essential change in our procedure in the case
of incomplete information is that the marginal benefit of treatment identified by LIV
must be projected onto the agent’s information set when selecting treatment to form the
expected marginal benefit of treatment conditional on the information available to the
agent. This coarsened version of BMTE is used to identify the marginal cost parameter.
In addition, only components of X that are known to the agent at the time of treatment
choice can aid in identification of the cost parameters. The exclusion restrictions for
identification of the cost parameter are variables in X that are not in Z and that are
known to the agent at the time of choosing treatment.
Let (XI , Z) denote components of (X,Z) that are observed by the agent when choos-
ing whether to select into treatment.9 Suppose that the agent’s information set is
9We assume that agents know all components of Z, while we allow agents to be ignorant of some
components of X. This assumption simplifies our notation and conforms to our empirical analysis
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(XI , Z, UI).
10 UI is the private information of the agent relevant to his or her own
benefits and cost of treatment, and is not observed by the econometrician.
We revise assumption (A-1) in the following way:
(A-1′) (U0, U1, UC , UI) is independent of (X,Z), and X is independent of Z conditional
on XI .
Assumption (A-1′) imposes the requirement that the private information of the agent is
independent of the observed regressors. Note that, under this independence assumption,
(U0, U1, UC , UI) ⊥⊥ (XI , Z), and
E(V |X,Z, UI) = E(V |XI , Z, UI) = E(V |UI),
using the definition V = UC − (U1 − U0).
Assumption (A-1′) implies that (X,Z) ⊥⊥ UI | (XI , Z), so that UI does not help the
agent predict elements of (X,Z) that are not contained in (XI , Z). Thus, we allow the
agents to have private information about their own idiosyncratic benefits (U1 − U0) and
costs UC , though we impose the restriction that the only information known by the agent
that is useful for predicting X is (XI , Z). Furthermore, Assumption (A-1
′) requires that,
conditional on the components of X known to the agent at the time of selecting into
treatment, Z does not help to predict those elements of X not known at the time of
treatment selection. This restriction is only imposed for notational convenience and can
be easily relaxed.
We restate Assumption (A-3) as:
(A-3′) The distribution of V˜ = E(V |UI) is absolutely continuous with respect to Lebesgue
measure, and the cumulative distribution function of V˜ is strictly increasing.
An implication of (A-3′) is that E(V |UI) is a nondegenerate random variable, and
thus that agents have some nontrivial information about their own idiosyncratic cost or
of Section 6. The analysis can be extended (at the cost of somewhat more cumbersome notation) to
allow agents to know only a subvector of Z as well as only a subvector of X at the time of selection
into treatment.
10In other words, the information set of the agent equals σ(X,Z,UI), the sigma-algebra generated by
(X,Z,UI).
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benefit from treatment when deciding whether to select into treatment. We maintain
Assumptions (A-2) and (A-4) as before.
Define µIj (XI) = E(Yj|XI) for j = 0, 1, and µIC(Z) = E(C|Z), and note that given our
independence assumptions and the law of iterated expectations, µIj (XI) = E(µj(X)|XI),
µIC(Z) = E(µC(Z)|Z). Define µIS(XI , Z) = E(S|XI , Z). Under our assumptions,
E(S|XI , Z, UI) = µIS(XI , Z)− V˜ = µI1(XI)− µI0(XI)− µIC(Z)− V˜ .
The decision rule becomes
D = 1 if E(S|XI , Z, UI) ≥ 0 ; D = 0 otherwise, (5.1)
where E(S|XI , Z, UI) is the expected surplus from treatment, with the expectation con-
ditional on the agent’s information set. We thus have
D = 1[µIS(XI , Z)− V˜ ≥ 0],
where our independence assumptions imply V˜ ⊥⊥ (XI , Z), and thus the selection model
is of the same form as that used by Heckman and Vytlacil (1999), which allows us to
use LIV to identify BMTE(x, uS). Redefining US = FV˜ (V˜ ) and P (XI , Z) = Pr(D =
1|XI , Z) = FV˜ (µIS(XI , Z)), we have
D = 1[P (XI , Z)− US ≥ 0],
with US distributed unit uniform and independent of (X,Z) and thus independent of
(XI , Z).
Define BMTEI (xI , uS) ≡ E(Y1 − Y0|XI = xI , US = uS), CMTEI (z, uS) ≡ E(C|Z =
z, US = uS), and S
MTE
I (xI , z, uS) ≡ BMTEI (xI , uS) − CMTEI (z, uS), the marginal benefit,
cost, and net surplus of treatment conditional on the agent’s information set, where again
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by the law of iterated expectations and our independence assumptions
BMTEI (xI , uS) = E(B
MTE(X, uS)|XI = xI , US = uS) = E(BMTE(X, uS)|XI = xI)
CMTEI (z, uS) = E(C
MTE(Z, uS)|Z = z, US = uS) = E(CMTE(Z, uS)|Z = z).
Evaluating SMTEI (xI , z, uS) at uS = P (xI , z), we obtain
SMTEI (xI , z, P (xI , z)) = µ
I
S(xI , z)− E(V |US = P (xI , z))
= µIS(xI , z)− E(V |V˜ = µIS(xI , z))
= µIS(xI , z)− E(V |E(V |UI) = µIS(xI , z))
= µIS(xI , z)− E(E(V |UI)|E(V |UI) = µIS(xI , z))
= µIS(xI , z)− µIS(xI , z)
= 0,
where the second equality is obtained by plugging in the definition of US, the third equality
is obtained by plugging in the definition of V˜ , and the fourth equality is obtained using
the law of iterated expectations and the fact that E(V |UI) is degenerate given UI . Since
SMTEI (xI , z, uS) = B
MTE
I (xI , uS)− CMTEI (z, uS), we have
BMTEI (xI , uS) = C
MTE
I (z, uS) for uS such that uS = P (xI , z).
Thus, identification of BMTEI (xI , P (xI , z)) provides identification of C
MTE
I (z, P (xI , z)).
Since our model is a special case of Heckman and Vytlacil (1999), we can follow them
in using LIV to identify BMTE(x, uS) for (x, uS) in the support of (X,P (XI , Z)). It is
important to note that LIV does not identify the BMTE(x, uS) that is relevant to the
agent’s decision problem. LIV identifies BMTE(x, uS) = E(Y1 − Y0|X = x, US = uS), not
BMTEI (xI , uS) = E(Y1−Y0|XI = xI , US = uS). However, we can project the BMTE(x, uS)
identified by LIV on the information known to the agent at the time of selecting into
treatment and coarsen the set used to define and identify BMTE(x, uS), to identify the
BMTEI (xI , uS) relevant to the agent’s decision problem. It is the latter that is relevant
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for identifying the cost functions. By the law of iterated expectations, we obtain
BMTEI (xI , uS) = E(B
MTE(X, uS)|XI = xI) =
∫
BMTE(x, uS)dFX(x|XI = xI), (5.2)
where FX( · |XI = xI) is the cumulative distribution function of X conditional on XI =
xI . We directly identify FX( · |XI = xI), and thus, for given uS, obtain identification of
BMTE(x, uS) for all x ∈ Supp(X|XI = xI) implies identification of BMTEI (xI , uS). Since,
for a given x, we identify BMTE(x, uS) if uS ∈ Supp(P (XI , Z)|X = x), we thus identify
BMTEI (xI , uS) if
uS ∈
⋂
x∈Supp(X|XI=xI)
Supp(P (XI , Z)|X = x).
In other words, to identify ex ante BMTEI (xI , uS), we need to identify ex post B
MTE(x, uS)
for every value x that X can take given XI = xI , and thus we need for uS to be an
element of Supp(P (XI , Z)|X = x) for each value x that X can take given XI = xI .
However, using the fact that XI is a subvector of X and independence assumption (A-
1′), it follows that Supp(P (XI , Z)|X) = Supp(P (XI , Z)|XI), and thus using Equation
(5.2) we identify BMTEI (xI , uS) for (xI , uS) in the support of (XI , P (XI , Z)). Using the
fact that BMTEI (xI , P (xI , z)) = C
MTE
I (z, P (xI , z)), we identify C
MTE
I (z, uS) for (z, uS) in
the support of (Z, P (XI , Z)). We have thus identified the marginal cost parameter, and
can integrate it to obtain other cost parameters. We can also combine it with the benefit
parameters to identify net surplus parameters as before. The only elements of X that
are useful for identifying the cost parameters are those elements that are in X, but not
in Z, and which are known to the agent at the time of selection into treatment (i.e., are
contained in XI).
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6 Estimating the Cost and Surplus from Educational
Choices
We apply our methodology to an analysis of educational choice and estimate the marginal
benefit, cost, and surplus from a college education. Carneiro et al. (2011) provide esti-
mates of the marginal benefit of attending college. We extend their work by adding
results for the subjective cost and surplus. Bjo¨rklund and Moffitt (1987) provide fully
parametric estimates of cost and surplus in the context of a manpower training program
in Sweden. Application of their approach offers a useful benchmark to gauge our more
flexible estimation strategy. Our nonparametric identification analysis follows Marschak
(1953) who noted that for many policy analyses only combinations of structural param-
eters are required. We embrace Marschak’s Maxim (Heckman, 2010) and implement an
estimation strategy with minimal assumptions and transparent sources of identification
for the marginal effects of treatment.
We analyze a sample of 1,747 white males from the National Longitudinal Survey of
Youth of 1979 (NLSY79).11 The outcome variable is the log of the mean non-missing
values of the hourly wage between 1989 and 1993, which we interpret as an estimate of
the log hourly wage in 1991, and an approximation to the long-run wage. Schooling is
measured in 1991 when individuals are between 28 and 34 years of age. We separate
individuals into two groups: persons with no college (D = 0) and persons with at least
some college (D = 1). We present annualized returns to education, obtained by dividing
all our estimates by four which is the average difference in years of schooling between
those with D = 1 and those with D = 0.
To identify the CMTEI (z, uS), we require variables that do not affect the cost of attending
college but that change future wages and are known to the agent at college entry (benefit
shifters). We measure long-run labor market conditions by permanent local wages and
compute average earnings between 1973 and 2000 for each location of residence at 17 as
a proxy. Since we will also condition on current labor market conditions at the time of
11See Bureau of Labor Statistics (2005) for a detailed description of the NLSY79 and Appendix C for
details on the construction of the variables.
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potential enrollment, these regressors should only affect the schooling decision through
their effect on agent’s expected future wages and thus the expected benefit of treatment.
We assume that the main benefits to a higher education are through earnings. Any other
subjective benefits, such as allowing access to jobs with preferred amenities, are implicitly
included (as a negative contribution) in costs. The validity of our exclusion restriction
would be threatened if our measure of permanent local wages affects the subjective benefit
of education.
We identify BMTE(x, uS) and B
MTE
I (xI , uS) using variables that do not affect future
wages but only the cost of attending college (cost shifters). We use current fluctuations in
local labor market conditions such as local wages at the time of the educational decision,
which shift the opportunity cost of schooling. They should not help to predict the agent’s
expected future wages as we also control for permanent local labor market conditions.
Effectively, we use only the innovations in local wages as cost shifters. We also include
tuition cost, a dummy variable indicating urban residence at age 14, and distance to
college as shifters that affect the direct cost of attending college.
Table 1 presents the covariates used in our empirical analysis. We highlight the two
different types of exclusion restrictions. Variables that affect benefits as well as costs of
treatment (common elements) include the Armed Forces Qualifying Test (AFQT) scores,
mother’s education, number of siblings, and cohort dummies. In what follows, we keep
this set of observables in the background to ease notation. X and Z continue to denote
the benefit and cost shifters respectively. XI is the subvector of X which is known to
the agent at the college entry decision. We include two variables in X not included in
XI : years of experience and wages in the county of residence. The excluded variables are
measured approximately 12 years after the agent’s college entry decision and thus not
in the individual’s information set at the time of the treatment decision. We follow the
analysis of Section 5 and allow agents to have imperfect foresight about the realizations of
these variables. They form expectations about their future wages but do not have perfect
information. In line with our exposition, we assume that Z does not help to predict the
ex post realization of X conditional on XI and denote the agents’ information about their
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idiosyncratic cost and benefit from treatment as V˜ = E (V | UI).
We specify a linear version of the generalized Roy model. Define potential outcomes:
Y1 = Xβ1 + U1 and Y0 = Xβ0 + U0.
The choice equation is:
D = 1
[
XI(α1 − α0)− Zγ > V˜
]
,
where we assume that agents form valid expectations about their own outcomes so that
E (X(β1 − β0) | XI) = XI(α1 − α0) holds. Note that XI does not only affect the returns
to education directly but also helps to predict the ex post realization of those elements
of X not contained in XI .
We first implement the traditional structural approach and explicitly estimate all com-
ponents of the generalized Roy model and combine them to form the marginal effect pa-
rameters (Bjo¨rklund and Moffitt, 1987). We impose normality for the unobservables and
fit the model by maximum-likelihood. As the participation decision is based on the net
surplus and X does not affect the cost of treatment, this implies a cross-equation restric-
tion between the coefficients onX in the outcome equations andXI in the choice equation.
We account for agents’ imperfect foresight and set (α1−α0) = (X¯ ′I X¯I)−1 X¯ ′I X¯(β1− β0),
where (X¯, X¯I) denote the matrices with the outcome shifters of the whole sample. We
estimate the whole model in one step. In a standard Probit model, the coefficients can
only be identified up to a factor of proportionality. However, as the wage gain (α1−α0)XI
appears with a coefficient of one in the choice equation, we do not need to normalize the
variance of V˜ and estimate it instead. We can then construct the marginal effects of
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treatment based on the results:
BMTE(x, uS) = x(β1 − β0) +
(
σU1−U0,V˜
σ2
V˜
)
Φ−1σV˜ (uS)
BMTEI (xI , uS) = xI(α1 − α0) +
(
σU1−U0,V˜
σ2
V˜
)
Φ−1σV˜ (uS)
CMTEI (z, uS) = zγ +
(
σUC,V˜
σ2
V˜
)
Φ−1σV˜ (uS)
SMTEI (xI , z, uS) = xI(α1 − α0)− zγ − Φ−1σV˜ (uS),
where σU1−U0,V˜ and σUC ,V˜ denote the covariance between (U1 − U0, V˜ ) and (UC , V˜ ), re-
spectively. Φ−1σV˜ indicates the inverse of a normal cumulative distribution function with
standard deviation σV˜ .
The sign of the slope of the marginal effect parameters is determined by σUC ,V˜ and
σU1−U0,V˜ as σ
2
V˜
> 0. We present our results for these parameters in Table 2. The esti-
mate for σU1−U0,V˜ is negative and thus the marginal benefits of treatment decrease when
moving along the margins of V˜ . The opposite is true for σUC ,V˜ and so the marginal cost
increases in uS. However, only σU1−U0,V˜ is significantly different from zero at the 10%
level.
Figure 2 presents our fully parametric results for the ex post marginal benefit and ex
ante cost and surplus parameters. We plot them as a function of uS and evaluate them
at the sample mean of (XI , Z). As agents are assumed to form valid expectations about
their future benefits, the ex ante and ex post marginal benefits are identical. Individuals
with a high unobserved desire for treatment (low uS) have the highest benefit, strictly
decreasing from +16% to −4%. The estimated surplus is positive for low values of uS and
decreases when moving along the margins of V˜ . The opposite holds for the marginal cost,
which is always positive and slightly increasing. The cost is lowest for individuals with
low values of uS and ranges from +3% to +10%. In summary, the benefit is highest and
cost lowest for those most likely to pursue a higher education. However, the estimates
are not precisely determined. The marginal benefit of treatment is significantly different
from zero for roughly half of the individuals. Along all margins of V˜ , the marginal cost of
a college education does not significantly differ from zero. By construction, the marginal
surplus is strictly positive for all those individuals who participate in the treatment and
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negative for those that do not. Conditional on the observables set to their sample mean,
Figure 2: Marginal Effects of Treatment, Parametric
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(a) Marginal Benefit of Treatment (ex post)
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(b) Marginal Cost of Treatment
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(c) Marginal Surplus of Treatment
individuals are indifferent towards treatment when uS = 0.51.
Figure 2 presents the marginal effect parameters over the full unit interval from the
structural model. The distributional assumptions on (U1, U0, V˜ ) expand the margins for
which we can identify the marginal effects of treatment. As we assume full independence
between all observables and unobservables, we identify the marginal effects of treatment
over the unconditional common support of P (XI , Z). In our sample, this support ranges
between 0.03 and 0.98. Adding joint normality, we can extrapolate even further and cover
the full unit interval.
However, our formal analysis demonstrates that in a fully nonparametric setting we
are only able to identify the BMTEI (xI , uS) over the support of P (XI , Z) conditional on
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XI = xI and the C
MTE
I (z, uS) over the support of P (XI , Z) conditional on Z = z.
We identify the SMTEI (xI , z, uS) over the intersection of the two supports. In Figure
3 we plot the conditional densities of P (XI , Z) in our data. As XI and Z are both
multidimensional, we condition on the decile of the relevant index, i.e. on XI(α1 − α0)
for the BMTEI (xI , uS) and Zγ for the C
MTE
I (z, uS).
12 The support is very limited and
thus the results of a fully parametric implementation rely heavily on extrapolation based
on the distributional assumptions.
12We trace out the remaining variation in P (XI , Z) by applying a two-dimensional kernel density esti-
mation with a bivariate normal kernel.
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Figure 3: Conditional Support
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(a) Support of P (XI , Z) conditional on XI(α1 − α0)
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(b) Support of P (XI , Z) conditional on Zγ
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We now develop a semiparametric estimation strategy that relies on fewer assumptions
and provides more transparent sources of identification. We apply Marschak’s Maxim,
estimating only those combinations of structural parameters needed for the marginal
effect parameters. To fix ideas, consider the estimation of the BMTE(x, uS), where the
conditional expectation of (U1 − U0) along the margins of V˜ is a key element. In the
fully parametric normal-theory approach, it is directly constructed from estimates of
(σU1,V˜ , σU0,V˜ ) and σ
2
V˜
:
E (U1 − U0 | US = uS) =
(
σU1−U0,V˜
σ2
V˜
)
Φ−1σV˜ (uS).
Instead, in what follows, we directly obtain E (U1 − U0 | US = uS) without having to esti-
mate all structural components. We will also carefully recognize the relevant conditional
support of P for each parameter and thus present a data-sensitive structural analysis
(Heckman, 2010).
We determine the support of P by building on an estimator of the joint support of the
distribution of (X,Z):
SˆX,Z = {(x, z) : ||(Xi, Zi)− (x, z)|| ≤  for some i},
where || · || corresponds to the Euclidean norm and i denotes a generic observation in
our data.13 Then, letting xI(x) indicate the appropriate subvector of x, our resulting
estimator for the support of (XI , Z) is:
SˆXI ,Z = {(x∗I , z∗) : ∃(x, z) ∈ SˆX,Z such that (xI(x), z) = (x∗I , z∗)}.
We can use these estimates to construct our desired support for the marginal cost and
13In practice, we set  such that at most 5% of the sample are within the support for a given pair of
(Xi, Zi).
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benefit parameters:
SˆX,P = {(x∗, p∗) : ∃(x , z) ∈ SˆX,Z such that (x, P (xI(x), z)) = (x∗, p∗)}
SˆXI ,P = {(x∗I , p∗) : ∃(xI , z) ∈ SˆXI ,Z such that (xI , P (xI , z)) = (x∗I , p∗)}
SˆZ,P = {(z∗, p∗) : ∃(xI , z) ∈ SˆXI ,Z such that (z , P (xI , z)) = (z∗, p∗)}.
Note, that the variation in p for a given x and xI(x) is the same in SˆX,P and SˆXI ,P . Thus
we can identify the BMTE(x, uS) and B
MTE
I (xI(x), uS) over the same margins. Finally,
for the marginal surplus parameter, we collect in SˆXI ,Z,P all (xI , z, p) where the relevant
subsets in SˆXI ,P and SˆZ,P overlap in p. We only report estimates for the margins within
these sets and thus acknowledge the limitations of the data.
We estimate the BMTE(x, uS) using the method of local instrumental variables (LIV)
proposed in Heckman and Vytlacil (1999, 2001b, 2005). They show that under our
conditions the BMTE(x, uS) is identified by differentiating the conditional expectation of
observed outcomes:
∂E( Y | X = x, P = p )
∂p
∣∣∣∣
p=uS
= BMTE(x, uS). (6.1)
Applied to sample data, this is the LIV estimator of Heckman and Vytlacil (1999).14 As
noted in Carneiro et al. (2011), it is empirically very difficult to apply the LIV estimator
while conditioning on all variables in the outcome equations. Thus we proceed by invoking
the stronger assumption that in addition to the variables in X, all elements common
to outcome and choice equations are independent of (U1, U0, V˜ ) as well. Because our
generalized Roy model is also linear, the conditional expectation of Y simplifies to:
E( Y | X = x, P = p ) = E( DY1 + (1−D)Y0 | X = x, P = p )
= xβ0 + px(β1 − β0) +K(p), (6.2)
14See the Web Appendix of Heckman et al. (2006) for a detailed description of the implementation of
the LIV estimator.
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where K(p) = E(U1 − U0 | D = 1, P = p) can be estimated nonparametrically. We
determine the parameters of Equation (6.1) by a partially linear regression of Y on X
and P . We proceed in two steps. The first step is the construction of P , and the second
step is the estimation of β1 and β0 using the estimated P . We carry out the first step
using a Probit regression of D on (XI , Z). In the second step we use Robinson (1988)’s
method for estimating partially linear models as extended in Heckman et al. (1997a).15
Next, consider the estimation of K(P ). Equation (6.2) implies that E( Y˜ ) = K(p), where
Y˜ = Y − xβ0 − px(β1 − β0) is the residualized observed outcome. We thus use a local
quadratic regression of Y˜ on P to estimate K(P ) and its partial derivative with respect
to P .16 We construct the ex post marginal benefit of treatment BMTE(x, uS) based on
these estimates:
BMTE(x, p) = x(β1 − β0) + ∂K(p)
∂p
∀ (x, p) ∈ SˆX,P .
For the ex ante marginal benefit of treatment, we account for the agents’ imperfect
foresight about the future realization of components of X. As agents form valid ex-
pectations, we calculate (α1 − α0) = (X¯ ′I X¯I)−1 X¯ ′I X¯(β1 − β0)17 and then construct the
BMTEI (xI , uS) as follows:
BMTEI (xI , p) = xI(α1 − α0) +
∂K(p)
∂p
∀ (xI , p) ∈ SˆXI ,P .
We can identify the CMTEI (z, uS) using the equality of the marginal cost and benefit
parameter at the margin of indifference:
CMTEI (z, p) = B
MTE
I (xI , p) ∀ (z, p) ∈ SˆZ,P . (6.3)
15We run kernel regressions of each of the regressors on P using a bandwidth of h = 0.05. We compute
the residuals of each of these regressions and then run a linear regression of Y on these residuals.
16We choose the bandwidth that minimizes the residual square criterion proposed in Fan and Gijbles
(1996), which gives us a bandwidth of h = 0.3.
17The economics of the model imply a restriction on the coefficients (α1 − α0) in the choice equation,
which depend on the estimated values of (β1−β0). However, we only learn about the values of (β1−β0)
using an initial estimate of P . We insure internal consistency of our estimation routine by iterating
between the estimation of the BMTE(x, uS) and P with restricted (α1 − α0) until convergence.
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This step directly mirrors Equation (4.2) from our nonparametric identification analy-
sis. We obtain an estimate for the marginal cost of treatment using only information on
the marginal benefits. We do not exploit any additional distributional assumptions such
as joint normality of the unobservables.
We finally determine the SMTEI (xI , z, uS) by taking the difference between benefits and
costs:
SMTEI (xI , z, p) = B
MTE
I (xI , p)− CMTEI (z, p) ∀ (xI , z, p) ∈ SˆXI ,Z,P . (6.4)
Figure 4 presents our semiparametric results for the ex ante benefit, cost, and surplus
parameters as well as the ex post benefit. We calculate the marginal effects at the
mean values in the sample (x¯, z¯) and at two additional points of evaluation (xA, zA) and
(xB, zB). We plot them as a function of uS within the relevant conditional support and
compute the 90% confidence bands using the bootstrap.18
18We use 2,000 bootstrap replications. In each iteration of the bootstrap we re-estimate P so all standard
errors account for the fact that P itself is an estimated object.
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Figure 4: Marginal Effects of Treatment, Semiparametric
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Our estimates show that individuals with a high unobserved desire for treatment (low
uS) have high benefits as well as high costs from participation. When moving up the
margins of uS the benefits fall more quickly than the costs as the surplus decreases. The
BMTEI (xI , uS) ranges from +37% within the support of x
A to as low as −12% within
the support of xB. The CMTEI (z, uS) varies between +32% and −6% overall, but within
each margin of support the variation is limited to about 4% in absolute value. We can
calculate the SMTEI (xI , z, uS) which ranges from +5% to −5% as the difference between
ex ante benefits and costs within the overlap of the support. Note that the estimates
for the marginal benefits at xB are all negative. However, costs are as well and so the
surplus is still positive at the lower end of the conditional support. After conditioning on
observables, it is unobservable heterogeneity in benefits and not costs that is driving the
college entry decision. However, all estimates are rather imprecise, precision is highest at
the mean values in the sample.
The conditional support is limited as shown in Figure 3. The location and range of
the support depends on the point of evaluation. In general, we can identify BMTE(x, uS)
and BMTEI (xI , uS) over longer stretches of uS than the C
MTE
I (z, uS) function. In fact, for
all xI , z evaluation points considered, the values of uS for which we identify C
MTE
I (z, uS)
is a subset of the values of uS for which we identify B
MTE
I (xI , uS). Hence, for the xI , z
evaluation points considered, we can identify SMTEI (xI , z, uS) only over the set of uS
values corresponding to the smaller set of uS values for which we identify C
MTE
I (z, uS).
The conditional variation in P is largest at x¯I where we can identify the longest stretch
for the BMTEI (x¯I , uS) with uS ∈ (0.42, 0.61), while it is smallest for CMTEI (zB, uS) with
uS ∈ (0.81, 0.89). Note that we identify all marginal effect parameters around the margin
of indifference at SMTEI (xI , z, uS) = 0.
We can also assess the magnitude of the expectation errors due to the agents’ imperfect
foresight about parts of their future benefits. Given our prediction model, the ex post and
ex ante benefits coincide for the average individual (x¯, z¯). However, a comparison between
realized and predicted benefits reveals that at xA, ex post benefits are overestimated by
about 9%, while at xB the prediction is only off by 3%.
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We can compare the results for the marginal effects of treatment between the two
estimation approaches at (x¯, z¯) within the conditional support. The semiparametric
approach indicates larger heterogeneity in benefits and costs due to the steeper slope
of the marginal effect parameters. In both cases, benefits decrease considerably when
moving along the margins of V˜ while variation in costs is limited. Thus, it is heterogeneity
in benefits that drives the college attendance decision. This is in line with the results
by Bjo¨rklund and Moffitt (1987), who also find that heterogeneity in rewards is more
important than heterogeneity in costs for the participation decision in their context of a
manpower training program in Sweden.
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7 Summary and Conclusion
This paper extends the modern treatment effect literature by developing a framework
for identifying both the marginal benefit and marginal cost of policies. The treatment
effect literature focuses only on the benefit side and does not address the question of
the subjective cost of treatment as perceived by the agents attempting to take it. We
build on the pioneering parametric analysis of Bjo¨rklund and Moffitt (1987) by extend-
ing the nonparametric analysis of Heckman and Vytlacil (1999, 2005, 2007) to identify
subjective cost and surplus functions. We provide identification results for the case of
perfect foresight (as in the previous literature) as well as cases with imperfect foresight
not previously considered. An analysis of college-going finds unobserved heterogeneity in
the benefits as well as costs of attending college, with agents selecting into college based
on both their idiosyncratic expected benefit and perceived cost of attending college. We
find more heterogeneity in expected benefits than in perceived cost. Thus, the observed
variability in college attendance is mainly driven by the variability in expected benefits.
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Table 1: Specification
X XI Z Common
Years of Experience (in 1991) X
Current Local Wages (in 1991) X
Permanent Local Wages X X
AFQT Scores X
Mother’s Education X
Number of Siblings X
Cohort Dummies X
Urban Residence X
Local Presence of Public College (age 14) X
Local Tuition at Public College (age 17) X
Local Wages (age 17) X
Notes: Our main specification includes years of experience (linear and squared), current local
wages (linear), permanent local wages (linear and squared), AFQT scores (linear and squared),
mother’s education (linear and squared), number of siblings (linear and squared), urban residence
(linear), cohort dummies (linear), local presence of public colleges (linear), local tuition of public
college (linear), and local wages (linear). All exclusions from the benefit equation are interacted
with AFQT scores, mother’s education, and number of siblings.
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Table 2: Slope Parameters
Parameter Estimate 90% Confi. p -val.
σ(U1−U0),V˜ -0.043 -0.206 / 0.002 0.06
σUC ,V˜ 0.017 -0.020 / 0.550 0.29
σ2
V˜
0.060 0.005 / 0.720 0.00
Notes: Confi. = Confidence Interval, p - val. = p -values.
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